Voluntary Commitment to Environmental Protection: A Bounded Rationality Approach

Global environmental protection is characterized as a public good. In contrast to the national level where the state is able to regulate external effects, there is a lack of supranational institutions which have enough power to force countries to reduce pollution levels. In spite of the free-riding problem it can nevertheless be observed that countries sometimes commit themselves to contribute to the public good `environmental protection'. The case of the Kyoto protocol for global $CO_2$ reduction demonstrates that some countries make substantial volunatry contributions, but others do not or on a much less level. The paper provides a game-theoretic explanation how the free-riding-problem can be overcome to some extent by voluntary cooperative behavior. It is analysed under which conditions free-riding countries can be motivated to make at least small pollution reduction efforts.global environmental policy, public good, voluntary cooperation, bounded rationality, game theory.

Playing Fair: Rationality and Norm-guided Behavior in Games

There is robust experimental evidence that in the ultimatum game real players often prefer a fair allocation which seems to be in contrast to rational decision making. In this paper rational maximizing behavior as well as norm-guided fair behavior are two possible behavioral rules. It is argued that behavioral rules are adopted according to their expected success before the ultimatum game is played. Using the concept of behavioral equilibrium profiles it is shown that conditional to the information status the players may adopt the fair behavioral rule instead of maximizing. Furthermore, conditions are derived where maximizing and fair behavior are both parts of a behavioral equilibrium profile. Also the relation to the indirect evolutionary approach is discussed.Rationality, fairness, ultimatum game, behavioral equilibrium

(Self-)Regulation of a Natural Monopoly via Complementary Goods - the Case of F/OSS Business Models

The paper investigates the optimal regulation of a (software) firm which acts as a natural monopolist, who also offers a complementary good (IT services) on a competitive market. It is shown that a first-best-regulation accompanyied with an optimal taxation schedule in order to compensate the losses is equivalent to a cross-subsidisation of the software by the complementary good. This is the same result as in business models with Free/Open Source Software (F/OSS). Even if a price of zero for F/OSS does not reflect the use of resources for software development, the price system in F/OSS related markets leads to a welfare improving allocation. F/OSS license models can be seen as institutional arrangements which mimick a social planner.natural monopoly, regulation, Ramsey pricing, welfare, complementary good, Open Source Software

Heterogeneous Behavioral Rules in the Oligopolistic Case

In a static symmetric duopoly the set of behavioral rules is extended to different types of markup pricing. Using an equilibrium concept suggested in Pasche (2001), it is shown that dependend on the markup neither pure Cournot nor pure Bertrand behavior is a behavioral equilibrium profile. Instead, there is a rationale for the usage of simple heuristics. The presence of markup rules leads to Stackelberg outcomes. Furthermore, pure markup behavior is more competitive than in Cournot case but less competitive than in Bertrand case. It is shown, that multiple behavioral equilibria and heterogeneous behavior may arise, where at least one player uses price setting strategies.oligopoly, markup rules, heterogeneity, behavioral equilibrium.

Fundamental Uncertainty, Portfolio Choice, and Liquidity Preference Theory

One of Keynes' core issues in his liquidity preference theory is how fundamental uncertainty affects the propensity to hold money as a liquid asset. The paper critically assesses various formal representations of fundamental uncertainty and provides an argument for a more boundedly rational approach to portfolio choice between liquidity and risky assets. The choice is made on the basis of individual beliefs which are subject to mental representations of the underlying economic structure. Self-consciousness arises when the agent is aware of the fact that beliefs are dispersed among agents due to the absence of a "true" model. Responding to this fact by increasing liquidity preference is rationalized by the higher ex post performance of choice. Moreover, we analyze the case that the portfolio is partially financed by debt. It is explored how fundamental uncertainty affects the volume of the portfolio and hence money and credit demand as well as the probability of debt failures.liquidity preference, portfolio choice, self-confidence, self-consciousness, fundamental uncertainty, bounded rationality, Keynes, Knight

Interbank Lending and the Demand for Central Bank Loans - a Simple Microfoundation

The paper presents a simple model of banking behavior where portfolio, liquidity, and liability management determine simultaneously the demand and supply of borrowed reserves on the interbank market. As the central bank is one player in this market due to its refinancing policy, it is able to determine the interest rate and henceforth the residual demand for central bank loans. Comparative static analysis shows how external or monetary policy shocks affect the behavior on the interbank market, the volume as well as the structure of the bank's balance sheet. It turns out that the banking firm behavior is non-linear and partially non-monotonous, indicating that the transmission of monetary measures is more complex when endogeneous banking behavior is taken into account.banking firm, balance sheet, interbank market, borrowed reserves, central banking, liquidity, transmission

Das Vertrauensspiel - eine verhaltensorientierte Erkl�rung

Es besteht empirische Evidenz, dass reale Spieler weitaus mehr Vertrauen und Vertrauensw�rdigkeit entwickeln als es nach den Voraussagen der klassischen Spieltheorie rational ist. Das Papier skizziert den Indirekt Evolution�ren Ansatz zur Erkl�rung der Entstehung von Vertrauen nach G�th und Kliemt (2000). Nach einer kurzen methodischen Diskussion des Ansatzes wird dessen Ergebnis im Rahmen eines alternativen verhaltensorientierten Erkl�rungsmodells zun�chst reproduziert und durch den Aspekt der sozialen Integration erweitert. Es zeigt sich, dass eine Senkung der Screening-Kosten die Investitionen in soziale Integration zur�ckdr�ngt.beschr�nkte Rationalit�t, indirekte Evolution, intrinsische Motivation, regelbasiertes Verhalten, Screening, soziale Integration.

Evolutorische Ökonomik und Ecological Economics

Die beiden Forschungsrichtungen Evolutorische Ökonomik und Ecological Economics kann man als Antwort auf die Defizite der neoklassischen Theorie bzw. speziell der traditionellen Um-weltökonomik verstehen. Insbesondere im Be-reich Ecological Economics führt der erweiterte Blickwinkel, der interdisziplinäre Rahmen und der Methodenpluralismus zu positiven Anstößen, aber auch zu Defiziten in der wissenschaftlichen Konkurrenzfähigkeit. Zudem ist die Kritik der traditionellen Theorie angesichts neuerer Ent-wicklungen auf den Prüfstand zu stellen. Die Ein-bindung in eine evolutorische Perspektive, die stärkere Verwendung formaler Methoden und der Abbau von Berührungsängsten gegenüber neo-klassischen Erklärungsmustern kann helfen, die-se Defizite zu überwinden

ESBies as a Basis for a TARGET2 Settlement Mechanism

The broadly discussed TARGET2 imbalances in the European Monetary Union result from the fact that there is no settlement mechanism such like the Interdistrict Settlement Accounts (ISA) in the Fed system. The proposal of Brunnermeier at al. (2011, 2017) of so-called European Safe Bonds (ESBies), although designed for different purposes, could be used as a remedy of this problem. In this brief note I suggest to use ESBies as a standardized safe asset for settling cross-border transfers of deposits

Volkswirtschaftliche Aspekte der Open-Source-Softwareentwicklung

Das Papier charakterisiert die spezifischen Eigenschaften des Gutes Software. Als Alternative zur Bereitstellung von Software über Märkte werden die Charakteristika der "freien" Open-Source-Softwareentwicklung dargestellt, bei der die Entwickler auf eine unmittelbare kommerzielle Verwertung ihrer erstellten Leistung verzichten und den Quellcode öffentlich zugänglich machen. Der Schwerpunkt liegt dabei weniger auf einer ökonomischen Begründung solcher freiwilligen Beiträge zu einem Softwareprojekt, sondern auf den volkswirtschaftlichen Effizienzwirkungen dieser Produktionsweise. Zentrale Bedeutung wird den Aspekten der Humankapitalbildung und -allokation, der Rolle der Wissensakkumulation und der positiven Spillovereffekte von Wissen, sowie der Wirkung auf die Wettbewerbsintensität im kommerziellen Softwaresektor beigemessen. Ferner wird diskutiert, inwiefern das Open-Source-Modell gegenüber der Bereitstellung über den Markt Defizite bei der Durchsetzung von Konsumentenpräferenzen aufweist. Das Papier ist gleichzeitig ein kritischer Kommentar zur Open-Source-Software-Studie von Kalwey u.a. (2003).Software, Open Source, Closed Source, Humankapital, Wissen, Netzwerkeffekte, Spillover, Effizienz, Verwertungsrechte, Marktunvollkommenheit.